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Case Digest
The purpose of the Case Digest is to identify and summarize for
the reader those recent and interesting cases that have less significance than those that merit an in-depth analysis. Included in the
digest are cases that apply established legal principles without
necessarily introducing new ones.
This digest includes cases reported mainly from October 1973
through January 1974. The cases are grouped into topical categories, and references are given for further research. It is hoped that
attorneys, judges, teachers and students will find that this digest
facilitates research in problems involving aspects of transnational
law.
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1. ACT OF STATE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE PRECLUDES PAYMENT OF INSURANCE POLICY'S
CASH SURRENDER VALUE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE LAW OF THE NATION GOVERNING THE CONTRACT

Plaintiff, an expatriated Cuban national, brought suit against
defendant, a United States life insurance company, to recover the
cash surrender value of his 1949 insurance policy that was executed
in Cuba, and which required payment of the policy in Cuba in
Cuban currency. In 1959, the Cuban Government promulgated a
law prohibiting all United States legal entities from making any
payments to Cuban nationals anywhere except in Cuba. Shortly
thereafter, in 1960, Cuba nationalized all United States-owned
property and businesses, expropriated defendant's Cuban assets
and assumed defendant's obligations to its Cuban policy holders.
The trial court in this subsequent action awarded judgment for
plaintiff, ordering defendant to pay the cash surrender value of the
policy in United States currency. On appeal, the Louisiana Court
Spring, 197,4
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of Appeal, held, reversed. The primary issue before the court was
whether it must apply Cuban law- to the insurance contract and
thereby absolve defendant of its contractual obligation to plaintiff.
The court observed that it is an almost universal rule that a contract of insurance must be governed by the law of the place where
the contract is finally consummated. Because this policy had been
issued in Cuba and required payment there in Cuban currency,
and because the parties clearly intended that enforcement of the
contract should occur in Cuba, the court reasoned that the policy
was a Cuban contract governed by Cuban law. Citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the court ruled
that the act of state doctrine bound the Louisiana courts to recognize the validity of applicable Cuban laws. Therefore, the Cuban
Government had replaced defendant as the insurer and obligor
under plaintiff's policy, and it was the entity to which plaintiff
must look for recovery. Fernandez v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co.,
281 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 1973).
2.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR MAY SUSPEND GAS AND OIL LEASES TO
CONSERVE MARITIME NATURAL RESOURCES

Plaintiff was the holder of eleven oil and gas leases in California's Santa Barbara Channel. After the 1969 Santa Barbara oil
spill, defendant, the Secretary of the Interior, exercised his authority under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-43 (1970) (OCS Act), to suspend operations on plaintiff's
Channel leases "in the interest of conservation" and for the purpose of permitting Congress to consider proposed legislation to
terminate the leases. In its suit to overturn the suspension, plaintiff contended that the Secretary's power to suspend the leases
adhered only for the purpose of conserving oil and gas, and not
natural resources in general, as the Secretary argued. In addition,
since the leases fully conformed to the OCS Act, one of the purposes of which is to develop the oil and gas resources of the outer
continental shelf, plaintiff argued that it could, and indeed must,
drill. Therefore, defendant could not suspend the leases in order
to give Congress time to pass legislation declaring them invalid.
The district court upheld plaintiff's claim, but on appeal the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Cir~uit reversed. Relying on a broad construction of the OCS Act and the environmental safeguards mandated in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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§§ 4321-47 (1970), the court determined that the Secretary acted
within his delegated authority to suspend, and thereby conserve,
the broad range of natural resources in the outer continental shelf.
Since drilling had not yet begun and it might have to be abandoned on passage of pending legislation, the court concluded that
the Secretary's evaluation of the environmental risks to the natural
resources of the area was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
discretion. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, No. 72-2449 (C.D. Cal., Nov.
27, 1973).
3.

ADMIRALTY

LIBEL IN REM AGAINST VESSEL DEMISE CHARTERED TO THE UNITED
STATES

Is

NOT WITHIN COURT'S JURISDICTION UNDER SUITS IN ADMI-

RALTY ACT WHEN SHIP IS OUTSIDE UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL

WA-

TERS

Plaintiff, a Panamanian corporation, advanced some 20,000 dollars in repairs, supplies and wages while acting as husbanding
agent for its vessel under time charter to defendant, the United
States. Claiming a maritime lien against the vessel for that
amount, plaintiff filed an in rem action while the vessel, on a
subsequent demise charter to the Government, was outside the
territorial waters of the United States. Plaintiff noted that because
the United States as demise charterer was the vessel's owner pro
hac vice under 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1970), it was unable to libel the
vessel in rem because the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 741-52 (1970), prohibits such actions against vessels owned or
operated by the United States. Plaintiff argued, however, that the
lien was enforceable against the Government because 46 U.S.C.
§ 742 gave the court jurisdiction to transform a libel in rem into
an enforceable in personam action. On re-entering territorial waters five weeks after the original suit was filed, the vessel was
seized in a separate in rem action brought by other lienors, declared off-hire by the Government, and sold to pay these liens.
Plaintiff intervened in this suit, but recovered only 1,935 dollars
because other liens had higher priority. After the district court
dismissed the original complaint, plaintiff filed an amended complaint claiming damages against the Government for the loss of its
lien's priority because 46 U.S.C. § 741 allegedly prevented it from
libeling the vessel in rem. The court granted the Government's
motion for summary judgment, holding plaintiff unable to libel the
vessel because of the vessel's absence from the court's jurisdiction
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when plaintiff made its complaint, and not because of section 741
immunity. In affirming this decision, the Court of Appeals determined also that plaintiff's in rem action was not made in personam
by 46 U.S.C. § 742 for the purposes of jurisdiction, that the Government was not responsible for the loss in value of plaintiff's lien
caused by its own delay in pursuing the allowable remedies when
the vessel had earlier been within the court's jurisdiction, and that,
contrary to the majority in Hudson Trading Company v. United
States, 28 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1928), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741, 746 allow the
Government to permit judicial seizure of merchant vessels chartered by it when necessary to limit its liability according to law.
Everett S.S. Corp. v. Liberty Navigation & Trading Co., Inc., 486
F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973).
STATUS AS CREW MEMBER OF AND A RELATIVELY PERMANENT CONNECTION WITH A FLOATING STRUCTURE REQUIRED FOR RECOVERY UNDER

THE JONES ACT

Plaintiff, a marine construction worker, suffered injuries while
helping to build a boathouse on a barge owned by defendant, his
employer, and moored at a shipyard. Seeking to invoke admiralty
jurisdiction in his action to recover damages for personal injuries
from defendant, plaintiff contended first, that as a seaman under
the Jones Act he could recover damages for defendant's negligence,
and secondly, that he was permitted to recover for injuries caused
by the barge's alleged unseaworthiness. The court reasoned that to
qualify is a Jones Act "seaman," plaintiff must demonstrate, inter
alia, that he was a member of the crew of and had a more or less
permanent connection with a floating structure. Finding that work
aboard barges constituted only ten per cent of plaintiff's total employment as a general shore-side construction worker, the court
concluded that plaintiff had failed to prove the requisite maritime
connection to qualify as a seaman entitled to sue in admiralty
under the Jones Act. Addressing the question of recovery for unseaworthiness, the court reasoned that, under McCown v. Humble Oil
Refining Co., 405 F.2d 596 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 934
(1969), plaintiff must establish that at the time of injury he was
doing a seaman's work. Since his duties as a shore construction
worker only occasionally took him aboard floating structures, the
court determined that plaintiff was not entitled to the warranty of
seaworthiness. Lewis v. Trego & Sons, 359 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Md.
1973).
Vol. 7-No. 2
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EMPLOYER MAY NOT SET OFF CONTRACTUALLY CREATED DISABILITY
PENSION BENEFITS AGAINST JURY VERDICT FOR ITS NEGLIGENCE UNDER

THE JONES ACT

Plaintiff, a seaman employed by defendant, sued under the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), and general maritime law for
injuries received aboard defendant's vessel and recovered a 40,000
dollar judgment. The sole issue on appeal was whether the district
court had correctly refused to allow defendant to set off against the
judgment disability pension benefits partially paid by defendant
to plaintiff. Defendant argued that set off of pension benefits is
proper for two reasons. First, section 5 of the Federal Employers
Liability Act, as incorporated into the Jones Act, provides that a
common carrier sued by an employee may set off "any sum it has
contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity
that may have been paid to the injured employee. . . on account
of the injury . . . for which said action was brought" (emphasis
added). Secondly, defendant contended that a tortfeasor need not
pay twice for the same wrong. Finding the question of set off to be
one of law for the court's determination and not for the jury, the
court rejected defendant's contentions. Citing as authority
Haughton v. Blackships,Inc., 462 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) and Hall
v. Minnesota Transfer Railway Co., 322 F. Supp. 92 (D. Minn.
1971), the court reasoned that pension benefits paid pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement were not contingent on defendant's negligence but constituted a "fringe benefit" and a "form
of compensation" for plaintiff's employment. The pension plan
agreement was held, therefore, to be "collateral" to defendant's
obligation to pay for its wrongdoing, and not within the set off
provision of the Jones Act. Similarly, because the judgment was
the sole burden imposed on defendant for its negligence, the court
found no double payment for the same tort. Russo v. Matson Navigation Co., 486 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1973).
4.
CAB

REGULATION

AVIATION

REQUIRING NOTICE ON TICKETS OF CARRIERS'

LIMITED LIABILITY FOR BAGGAGE Is CONSISTENT WITH WARSAW CONVENTION AND WITHIN FEDERAL AVIATION

ACT

Plaintiff, a German airline engaged in international operations,
appealed an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) requiring
all air carriers operating in the United States to note on their
Spring, 1974
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passenger tickets their limitation of liability for baggage loss or
damage. Plaintiff argued that the regulation violated the provision
of the Warsaw Convention that plaintiff alleged governed exclusively the information required on passenger tickets, and that by
issuing the regulation the CAB had exceeded its authority under
the Federal Aviation Act (FAA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reasoned that
the Convention provisions are not exclusive, nor meant as a protective shelter to shield air carriers in any way from public responsibility. The CAB regulations, the court concluded, assist in affording the public the necessary ample opportunity to comprehend the
limitation on baggage liability imposed by carriers. The court also
found the regulation permissible under the broad authority conferred on the CAB by the FAA to regulate and control the public's
notice of liability limitations that carriers may impose. Deutsche
Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 479 F.2d
912 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
5.

BORDER SEARCHES

EVIDENCE FROM SEARCH OF ALIEN PAROLED INTO UNITED STATES AND

HELD IN CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL CUSTODY BY ENTRY OFFICIALS

Is

AD-

MISSIBLE AS DERIVED FROM A BORDER SEARCH

Appellant, an alien admitted into the United States on a "deferred inspection parole" status and held in continuous physical
custody thereafter, was tried for illegally importing and possessing
cocaine with the intent to distribute. Arguing that the evidence,
discovered a week after his detention on other grounds, was obtained without a warrant in violation of the fourth amendment,
appellant filed a motion to suppress the introduction of the cocaine
as evidence. In denying the motion, the federal district court relied
on the government's contention that the search fell within one of
the exceptions to fourth amendment warrant requirements, and,
in affirming, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined
that the case involved a border search. In reaching this conclusion,
the court specifically relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1970), which
declares that an alien's entry on a deferred inspection parole basis
is not an admission to the United States. Therefore, the court
reasoned, although appellant was physically within the boundaries
of the United States on temporary parole, he was considered to be
"standing at the border" because he had not been fully admitted.
The court carefully limited, however, its characterization of one
Vol. 7-No. 2
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standing at the border in a deferred inspection parole status, and
thereby susceptible to a border search, to those aliens who have
been held in continuous physical custody by entry officials, provided the alien is not detained for an unreasonable length of time.
United States v. Christancho-Puerto, 475 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.
1973).
CUSTOMS AGENTS CANNOT LAWFULLY OPEN A LETTER-SIZED ENVELOPE
ABSENT REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT IT CONTAINS SOMETHING OTHER

THAN A LETTER

The United States Government, pursuant to section 305 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970), sought to confiscate
and destroy the contents of four envelopes mailed to the United
States from abroad on the ground that each contained obscene
material and, therefore, was unlawfully imported. After finding
that these imported materials were unquestionably obscene as required by section 305, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York addressed the issue whether the envelopes were
opened legally by customs officials. Noting that customs agents
need have only a mere reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to
justify a search at a border crossing or area, the court reasoned that
a mailroom could be characterized as a "border area" for applying
this mere suspicion standard in evaluating the customs agent's
search of this mail. The court then held that three of the four
envelopes on their face raised reasonable suspicions that clearly
justified intrusions by customs agents. As to the fourth envelope,
however, the court found that neither on its face nor based on the
expertise or experience of the customs officials did it offer such a
suspicion of obscene contents and, therefore, was opened improperly. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise,
363 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
6.

EXTRADITION

JUDICIAL FAILURE TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY OF INDIVIDUAL CHARGES
FOR WHICH EXTRADITION IS SOUGHT Is CURABLE ON WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PROVIDED TO WARRANT EXTRADITION
FOR ONE OF THE CHARGES

Appellant, an Israeli citizen, was sought by Israel from the
United States pursuant to the extradition treaty between these
nations following an Israeli court's issuance of a nineteen-count
Spring, 1974
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indictment charging appellant with the operation of an allegedly
fraudulent investment enterprise. Appellant was apprehended and
subjected to an extradition hearing before the District Court for
the Southern District of New York, which then certified to the
Secretary of State that the evidence presented warranted extradition. Petitioning on a writ of habeas corpus for discharge from
custody, appellant contended, inter alia, that all of the charges
were not extraditable under the terms of the extradition treaty.
The district court denied the petition, and on appeal the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Relying on the principle
of specialty recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), the court determined that the judge
hearing the application for extradition must decide the competency of each of the individual charges for which extradition is
sought. The lower court's failure to follow this procedure, the court
concluded, nonetheless was curable following a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus if sufficient evidence existed to warrant extradition for one of the charges. Lacking a clear precedent, the court
reasoned that such a determination is consistent with the judiciary's role in extradition proceedings and would not infringe on the
powers of the executive branch of government. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1973).
7.

INSURANCE

GUERRILLA HIJACKING AND DESTRUCTION OF AIRPLANE IS COVERED BY
AIRLINE'S ALL-RISK INSURANCE POLICY CLAUSE EXCLUDING FROM
COVERAGE LOSSES RESULTING FROM WAR RISKS

Plaintiff's airliner was hijacked by members of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and ultimately taken
to Cairo where it was destroyed. Defendant denied liability under
the "all-risk" insurance policy issued by it to plaintiff by relying
on the clause excluding payment for losses from "any taking of the
property insured or damage to or destruction thereof. . . by any
military . . . or usurped power, . . ." or resulting from "war, ...
civil war, . . . insurrection or warlike operations . . . ." The district court noted the general rule that doubts and ambiguities in
an insurance policy should be resolved against the insurer, especially when the doubt relates to exceptions from the coverage of
"all risks." The court observed that this standard "war risk" exclusion clause was not precisely applicable to the circumstances of the
disputed loss, and determined that the loss was not attributable
Vol. 7-No. 2
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to "war, . . . insurrection or warlike operations," nor to the actions
of a "military or usurped power," since the PFLP was a nongoverning and entirely self-serving political group whose intentional
infliction of violence on nonbelligerent civilians occurred far from
the locale of any warfare. In addition, since hijacking was a risk
well known to defendant, and described by it with clarity and
precision in its other policies, the court reasoned that the ambiguity of defendant's phraseology here should result in an interpretation favoring coverage rather than exclusion. PanAmerican World
Airways, Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 42 U.S.L.W.
2185 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1973).
8.
FINALITY AND

JURISDICTION

ENFORCEABILITY

OF FOREIGN ARBITRATION

AWARD

ABROAD Is NOT DETERMINATIVE OF RECOVERY ON AWARD IN UNITED
STATES

Plaintiff, a United States citizen, and defendant, a German
bank, entered into an investment agreement that contained a complex arbitration clause providing that disputes would be arbitrated
in Germany before a board of arbitration whose award would be
final. In 1965, a dispute arose and an appropriate panel issued an
award in favor of plaintiff which was upheld by a lower German
court. Pursuant to article VI(2) of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct.
29, 1954, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, 1845-46, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, plaintiff sought enforcement of the award in a New York federal district
court. Defendant moved to stay this action pending final appeal
in Germany of the arbitration award in the belief that, under the
Treaty, the finality and enforceability of the arbitration award
under German law was determinative in this New York suit. The
court construed the Treaty as including, but not limiting, those
awards that would be enforced in the United States to awards that
are final and enforceable in Germany. Under von Engelbrechten
v. Galvanoni & Nevy Bros., Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 791, 300 N.Y.S.2d 239
(1969), the court found that the award was enforceable in New
York prior to final appeal, and the court determined that the foreign judgment in the lower court eliminated any genuine issue of
material fact. Furthermore, since plaintiff was entitled to pursue
simultaneously two separate actions to enforce his award, the court
denied defendant's motion to stay. Landegger v. Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank, 537 F.Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Spring, 1974
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COURT MAY CONDITION GRANT OF STAY PENDING RESOLUTION OF
PRIOR FOREIGN ACTION ON COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN STIPULATIONS

Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania insurance company, engaged defendant, a Delaware corporation headquartered in London, England,
as its exclusive overseas sales representative. Defendant corporation later sued plaintiff in England for breach of contract. While
this action was still pending, plaintiff sued defendant and its principal owners in Delaware alleging fraud in the inducement of their
contract and seeking restitution and an accounting. Defendants
then moved alternatively for a dismissal of the Delaware suit on
the ground of forum non conveniens or a stay pending the outcome
of the English action. In addressing this plea, the Delaware Chancery Court recognized that most of the witnesses and much of the
evidence were in England. Nevertheless, it refused to dismiss the
suit because of its concern about the slow progress of the English
action, the alleged disadvantage to plaintiff under English discovery procedures, and the lack of a complete identity of issues in the
two suits. Instead, the court decided that efficiency, judicial economy and respect for defendant's initial choice of forum justified
granting a stay pending resolution of the English suit provided that
the parties complied with two conditions: first, plaintiff must
amend its English counterclaim to include all issues in the instant
case, and secondly, all parties must voluntarily ensure that the
English action offers discovery procedures comparable to those
available in Delaware courts. Life Assurance Co. v. Associated
Investors InternationalCorp., 312 A.2d 337 (Del. Ch. 1973).
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) FOR FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION Is LACKING WHEN ALIEN CORPORATION'S

PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN UNITED STATES IS WITHIN STATE OF

ADVERSARY'S PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS OR INCORPORATION

Plaintiff, a Bahamian corporation, brought suit in federal court
against defendants, plaintiff's brokerage firm, seeking the return
of allegedly stolen bonds, or indemnification for the money it had
paid for these securities. Challenging the court's subject matter
jurisdiction, defendants Sought to dismiss the action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970) on the ground of an absence of the
requisite complete diversity between the parties. Defendants asserted that for jurisdictional purposes some of them were citizens
of Illinois, the site of the suit, because they were incorporated in
Illinois or maintained their principal places of business there,
Vol. 7-No. 2
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while plaintiff allegedly also was an Illinois citizen under section
1332(c), although chartered in the Bahamas, because Illinois was
its principal place of business. Plaintiff responded by arguing first,
that its Illinois office engaged solely in manipulating its stock account and so was not its principal place of business, and secondly,
that section 1332(c) was inapplicable because alien corporations
are citizens only of the foreign states of their charter. The District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed plaintiff's suit,
and determined that section 1332(c) applies to alien corporations
whose principal place of business is in the United States. Rejecting
the interpretation of section 1332(c) advocated by the District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
and subsequent decisions, the court determined that Congress intended in that section to limit federal court diversity jurisdiction.
The protection of federal courts was unnecessary in cases like this
one, the court concluded, in which an alien corporation maintained
its principal place of business in the state where its legal adversary
resided, because the foreign entity in effect was no longer an outsider. Southeast Guaranty Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
9.

TAXATION

PURCHASE OF FOREIGN HOLDING COMPANY STOCK AS MEANS TO AcQUIRE INDIRECTLY LESS THAN TEN PER CENT OF ANOTHER FOREIGN
COMPANY DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR DIRECT INVESTMENT EXCLUSION TO
INTEREST EQUALIZATION TAX

Appellants purchased 23 per cent of the stock of Westsales Corporation, a Luxembourg corporation whose only assets on the date
of purchase were less then one per cent of the stock of Western
Sales, Ltd., a Bahamian entity. The appellants paid under protest
the interest equalization tax required on the purchase by § § 491131 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and argued that the
acquisition qualified for the "direct investment" exemption in
section 4915(a)(1) for purchases of more than ten per cent of the
stock of foreign corporations. Section 4515(c)(1), however, provides
that this exemption does not apply when a foreign entity is
"availed of' for the principal purpose of acquiring stock whose
direct acquisition would be subject to the tax. Appellants denied
the applicability of that exception because they alleged that it
adhered only to holding companies with continuing securities operSpring, 1974

CASE DIGEST

ations, and because appellants arguably had not "availed of'
Westsales to avoid a tax that would have been assessed had the
purchase of Western Sales stock been made directly. The Commissioner disallowed appellants' claim to the section 4915(a)(1) exemption, reasoning that appellants did so "avail of' Westsales to
avoid tax, and, alternately, that appellants had not made a "direct
investment" since they were not actively engaged in the corporation's management. The district court ruled for the Commissioner,
and on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held,
affirmed. The court did not reach the argument concerning appellants' involvement in Westsales' management. Instead, the court
found that the tax applies to the purchase of stock in all such
holding companies, whether or not engaged in continuing securities operations, the practical consequence of which is the avoidance of the interest equalization tax. Garrettv. United States, 479
F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1973).

Vol. 7-No. 2

